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Neglected Dimensions of Global Security
The Global Health Risk Framework Commission
The world has experienced global health crises ranging from novel influenzas (H5N1 and H1N1) and coronaviruses (SARS and MERS) to the Ebola and Zika viruses.
In each case, governments and international organizations seemed unable to react quickly and decisively.
Health crises have unmasked critical vulnerabilities—
weak health systems, failures of leadership, and political overreaction and underreaction. The Global Health
Risk Framework Commission, for which the National
Academy of Medicine served as the secretariat, recently set out a comprehensive strategy to safeguard
human and economic security from pandemic threats
(eTable in the Supplement).1

The Business Case for Health Security
The international community has significantly underestimated the risk that pandemics pose to human life and
livelihood. The HIV/AIDS pandemic has killed more than
35 million people since the late 1960s.2 Even relatively
low-mortality events have substantial economic consequences. During the Ebola epidemic, the 3 most affected West African countries experienced aggregate cumulative gross domestic product losses of more than
10%,3 while the economic cost of SARS was estimated
at more than $40 billion.4 The commission’s modeling
suggests 21st-century pandemics could cost in excess of
$6 trillion, with an annualized expected loss of more than
$60 billion.1 The scale of human and economic harm
from pandemics compares with war, terrorism, and financial crises, yet funding dedicated to pandemic
preparedness is of an entirely different magnitude.
The commission proposed an incremental $4.5 billion per year for spending on health systems, emergency response, and research. This investment should
yield significant benefits, protecting the public from infectious diseases and related risks such as antimicrobial resistance and bioterrorism. By spending just 65
cents per person per annum, the world would gain a far
greater dividend in human and economic security. The
secretary-general of the United Nations (UN) should
commission a triannual review to ensure effective implementation. National governments and multilateral financing agencies, among others, should fully fund the
preparedness agenda set out by the commission.

National Health Systems
National health systems are the foundation of a global
health risk framework. The International Health Regulations is an international treaty that requires 196 countries,
or States Parties, to build and maintain core health system
capacitiestodetect,assess,report,andrespondto“potential public health emergencies of international concern.”5
Currently, States Parties perform self-assessments of their

core capacities, but only 64 of the countries have affirmed
meeting core capacities.6 Self-assessments, moreover,
are inherently unreliable and cannot ensure uniformly
high-quality national preparedness.
The World Health Organization (WHO) should require States Parties to undergo independent and transparent assessments, with an annual report submitted to
the World Health Assembly. Peer reviewers would use
objective standards to assess capacities and performance. Governments would be required to create national plans to achieve public health core capacities
funded through domestic budgets, with international assistance to fill any capacity gaps. The World Bank and
other donors should condition financial assistance based
on a country’s agreement to participate in external
assessments.
Resilient health systems must have well-trained
health workers and community participation to build
public trust and provide culturally appropriate services. Health systems should incorporate a “One Health”
strategy because most diseases in humans are spread
from animals. A One Health strategy recognizes that the
health of humans is connected to the health of animals
and the environment and integrates veterinary and agricultural perspectives. If robust health systems were
seen as vital to national security, it would strengthen
political will and mobilize resources.

International Leadership and Governance
While a national health system is the foundation of security, international leadership is at the apex because infectious diseases rapidly transcend borders. A global response also transcends the health sector, encompassing
transportation, commerce, trade, and the environment. Global coordination across diverse sectors requires managing logistics, deploying medical teams and
equipment, and mobilizing humanitarian assistance.
Preparedness against infectious diseases is a global
public good—deficiencies in one country endanger
all of humanity. That is why international norms and
well-functioning institutions are essential.
Yet Ebola revealed major deficiencies in governance, particularly at WHO.7 WHO must improve its ability to coordinate with other UN agencies, regional networks, and nonstate actors. Through various incentives,
these parties should hold countries publicly accountable for timely reporting of outbreaks of potential international importance. Multilateral finance agencies (eg,
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and regional
development banks) should raise and disperse financial resources for pandemic preparedness and response. Access to favorable investment terms could be
influenced by country preparedness.
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A well-equipped WHO Center for Health Emergency Preparedness and Response (CHEPR) would be the most important WHO organizational reform—operating scientifically and apolitically. The
CHEPR would have its own executive director (at the deputy directorgeneral level) and would report directly to an independent technical governing board. The center would oversee all WHO emergency preparedness and response functions including International
Health Regulations implementation. It would create a daily highpriority watch list of diseases with potential to become public health
emergencies of international concern. A 5% ($50 million over 20162017) increase in core contributions of the member states would
cover the center’s incremental startup costs as well as a sustainable $100 million contingency fund for WHO operations and
emergency surge response.
The center’s routine operations would remain within the WHO
Secretariat. However, if a crisis escalates to a high-level international threat or broader humanitarian disaster, the technical governing board would report to the UN secretary-general to lead an
integrated, multiagency response. The transition to the UN would
generate political and financial commitment, triggering intensified
UN agency action.

Accelerating Research and Development
Emerging and resurgent infectious diseases demand rapid development of fit-for-purpose tools and technologies, such as vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, personal protective equipment, and medical devices. The Ebola epidemic highlighted important deficiencies
in the deployment of medical products. An effective research and
development (R&D) strategy would include an international coordinating entity; sustainable investments; convergence of diverse
regulatory pathways; and access to intellectual property, data, and
biological samples—ensuring rigorous scientific standards. Success
requires community engagement and anthropological input to
promote swift adoption of new technologies.
The R&D community—academia, government, industry, and civil
society—must be galvanized into a cohesive group to determine
swiftly the biomedical interventions needed to respond to a panARTICLE INFORMATION
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demic, identifying key gaps that require collective ingenuity and
funding. In interpandemic phases, when there is no pressing emergency, the R&D community must develop knowledge and have
products ready for advanced development.
To carry out these functions, WHO should establish a highlevel expert panel that is independent from WHO and reports to
the technical governing board. The Pandemic Product Development Committee would be composed of 15 members with worldclass expertise in discovery, development, regulatory approval,
and medical product manufacturing. The committee would set priorities for R&D on high-risk pathogens, mobilize resources, coordinate public/private actors, reduce redundancies and cost, and
create a strategic R&D.
Accelerated R&D requires significant new financing, with a recommended incremental spend from governmental health and defense and private sources of $1 billion per year for at least 15 years.
Used synergistically with existing and new public and private expenditures, these funds would build and sustain R&D preparedness. The $1 billion figure can be compared with the scale of a small
to medium pharmaceutical company’s R&D activities working on a
portfolio of promising drugs and vaccines for key target diseases.
With this relatively modest investment, early research on Pandemic Product Development Committee–prioritized pathogens and
platforms would be completed before a crisis arises, making it be possible to move products more quickly to clinical testing, regulatory
approval, production, and deployment.
There is no question that the world will face pandemics in the
future; the only question is the level of national and global preparedness and response. The commission recommends a bold, 3-pronged
framework: reinforcing national public health capabilities, strengthening WHO and the UN system, and accelerating R&D. The scale of
these reforms and the $4.5 billion incremental financing proposed
by the commission is not trivial, but neither is it beyond reach. In the
context of estimated expected economic annualized losses from pandemics of more than $60 billion, it is a very good investment. Considering the threat to human lives, the normative and business case
is compelling.
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